This invention relates to vaccinia virus strains, compositions including the strains, and methods employing the strains.
Variola virus, the causative agent of smallpox, is a member of the Orthopoxvirus genus, which also includes monkeypox, cowpox, and vaccinia viruses. The disease caused by variola major strains is characterized by a low infectious dose (10-100 virions), a long incubation period (averaging 12 days), fever, constitutional symptoms, rash progressing to a pustular stage, death in up to 30% of those affected, and scarring in survivors. The disease is spread person-to-person via the respiratory route by contact (droplets) and, possibly, by aerosol.
Smallpox was one of the most important causes of morbidity and mortality worldwide throughout the first half of the 20th century. However, in part because of the lack of an animal reservoir for the virus, the systematic use of a vaccine (live, attenuated vaccinia virus) was highly effective in fighting this disease. Indeed, between 1967-1977, a global program of smallpox eradication resulted in the elimination of the natural disease (Fenner et al., WHO, Geneva, p. 1460, 1988). Because of the absence of smallpox and the risk of vaccine-associated adverse events, routine vaccination of children, hospital personnel, and military personnel was ceased, leaving only persons working with vaccinia and related viruses in the laboratory being immunized. Thus, a substantial portion of the world's population has no immunity to smallpox. The remaining population has little residual immunity, as vaccine immunity lasts only 5 years after primary vaccination and less than 20 years after revaccination. The eradication of smallpox and the cessation of vaccination have, thus, created vulnerability in the population to covert attack or biowarfare employing variola virus. Should such an event occur, epidemic spread would be unchecked by an immune barrier in the population (Anon. (Editorial), Lancet 353:1539, 1999; Henderson, Science 283:1279-1282, 1999; Henderson et al., J.A.M.A. 281:2127-2137, 1999).
Because of the uncertainties surrounding the smallpox eradication, vaccine was stockpiled for emergency use. In the United States, for example, 155,000 vaccine vials (nominally 15.5 million doses) produced by Wyeth Laboratories were originally stockpiled under the control of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, Ga. At a meeting of the National Vaccines Advisory Committee in January 1999, the CDC reported on the status of the national smallpox vaccine repository. At that time, of the 15.5 million doses held by Wyeth, 3.4 million doses had failed quality control testing and 10.3 million were beyond the expiration date specified by the last control test for extended dating, leaving 1.7 million doses that met release specifications (LeDuc, Presentation to the National Vaccines Advisory Committee, Washington D.C., Jan. 11-12, 1999). In addition to the limited supply, the vaccine is packaged in 100 dose vials, which restricts distribution and increases the likelihood of wastage during an emergency.
In addition to the U.S. stockpile, there is a supply of vaccine (Lister, Elstree strain) stored at the National Institute of Public Health, Bilthoven, Netherlands, and certain other countries have supplies of smallpox vaccine, which at the time of eradication may have included up to 300 million doses. However, similar problems of stability in storage have reduced this supply to less than 50 million doses (Henderson, Science 283:1279-1282, 1999).